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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, the bankruptcy doctrine of debt
recharacterization has been primarily used by creditors to question whether
an insider's' "loan" transaction with a company was in fact an equity
contribution, entitled to lower repayment priority in bankruptcy. 2 Insiders are
likely to become a more significant source of financing for close corporations
because of increasingly hesitant outside lenders and limited access to capital
markets, given the current economic climate.3 Furthermore, business
I 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006):
The term 'insider' includes-. . . if the debtor is a corporation- (i) director of the
debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; (iv) partnership
in which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general partner of the debtor; or (vi)
relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor...
2 See Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Domier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d
225, 229 (4th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Dornier Aviation] (parent corporation owned 100%
of debtor); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund 11, L.P. (In re Submicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d
448, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Submicron Sys.] (insiders holding seats on
debtor's board loaned $20 million in exchange for subordinated notes); Bayer, Corp. v.
MascoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 731-33 (6th Cir. 2001)
(insiders advanced funds to lender to enable additional loans); Fabricators, Inc. v.
Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1465-66 (5th Cir.
1991) (creditor deemed insider of debtor); Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N & D
Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 728 (11 th Cir. 1986) (challenge to controlling shareholder's
secured claim to funds loaned to debtor for payment of consumer creditors); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital
Partners, LLC (In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R. 820, 838 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
(creditors committee sought recharacterization of insider-lender loans as equity); In re
Micro-Precision Tech., Inc., 303 B.R. 238, 240-47 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2003) (transaction
whereby original loan altered via debt conversion agreement into preferred stock then
reconverted hack to debt not recharacterized as capital contribution); Citicorp Real
Estate, Inc. v. PWA, Inc. (In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs., Ltd. P'ship), 240 B.R. 124,
125-26 (Bankr. D.C. 1999) (partner advances to debtor-partnership determined capital
contributions not loans); In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 914 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1997) (determining that debtor's limited partners made equity contributions and
therefore had no "claim" in bankruptcy); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 626-27
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (shell corporation existing solely to pass funds from debtor's
largest shareholder to debtor "on an as needed basis" to expand debtor's business).
3 Simona Covel, Slump Batters Small Businesses, Threatening Owners' Dreams,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2008, at Al ("In October, the most recent data available, the
Federal Reserve Board reported that 90% of U.S. banks had tightened lending standards
on small businesses in the previous three months. That hurts young businesses that need
to finance growth.").
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bankruptcies have risen in the past year, a trend that should continue into the
near future.4 The combination of increased insider financing and potential
bankruptcy filings will present courts with creditor committee assertions that
an insider's "claim" against the debtor in bankruptcy must be
"recharacterized" as an equity interest because it does not realistically
represent a debt obligation of the debtor.5
The ramifications of debt recharacterization are severe, removing parity
between similarly situated creditors with respect to purported debt
transactions. 6 Therefore, the remedy must be carefully applied such that a
4~ See Rebecca Wilder, The Hottest Trend in 2009: Declaring Bankruptcy, ROUBMN
GLOB3AL EcoN., Dec. 29, 2008, http://www.rgemonitor.com/financemarkets-monitor/
254903/the -hottest -trend -in_-2009_-declaring_ bankruptcy. Retail bankruptcy filings have
increased from thirteen in the fourth quarter of 2007, eleven in the first quarter of 2008,
and twelve in the second quarter of 2008, to twenty in the third quarter of 2008. 1d. 2008
third quarter business bankruptcy Chapter I11 filings increased by 50%. Id.
5 The Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." I11 U.S.C.
§ 101(12). A "claim" is a"right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ... Id § 101(5)(A). "Equity" is not
defined in the Code, but "equity security" is, meaning a "share in a corporation, whether
or not transferable or denominated 'stock', or similar security. ... interest of a limited
partner in a limited partnership .. , or .. . warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to
purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share, security, or interest of a kind [previously]
specified ... Id § 101(16).
6 The Bankruptcy Code regulates payments from the debtor's estate in Section
726(a). Id 11I U.S.C. § 726(a). The priority hierarchy is as follows:
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be
distributed-
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order specified in,
section 507 of this title, proof of which is timely filed under section 501 of this title
or tardily filed on or before the earlier of-
(A) the date that is 10 days after the mailing to creditors of the summary of the
trustee's final report; or
(B) the date on which the trustee commences final distribution under this section;
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim, other than a claim of a kind
specified in paragraph (1), (3), or (4) of this subsection, proof of which is-
(A) timely filed under section 501 (a) of this title;
(B) timely filed under section 50 1(b) or 50 1(c) of this title; or
(C) tardily filed under section 50 1(a) of this title, if-
1892010]
190 ~OHIO STA TE LA W JOURNAL [o.7:
debt transaction is not recharacterized as equity merely because it emanated
from an insider source or because its terms reflected an anomalous economic
condition.
The judicially created doctrine of debt recharacterization is thoroughly
embedded in the vast majority of federal bankruptcy, district, and circuit
courts that have heard the issue.7 Nevertheless, its application varies between
circuits and among states; therefore, it is slightly misleading to call debt
recharacterization an established doctrine. Judicial application, as
exemplified by two recent circuit court decisions, Dornier Aviation8 and
Submicron Systems,9 has coalesced around two overarching inquiries: either
(1) whether the transaction reflects an arm's length negotiation (evidenced by
a loan's objective terms),' 0 or (2) whether the intent of the parties was to
create a debt."I Such tests scrutinizing the substantive reality of a challenged
loan to a company originate from eleven non-dispositive factors used to
distinguish debt from equity in a Sixth Circuit tax law case (the "Roth Steer'
(i) the creditor that holds such claim did not have notice or actual knowledge of the
case in time for timely filing of a proof of such claim under section 501(a) of this
title; and
(ii) proof of such claim is filed in time to permit payment of such claim;
(3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim proof of which is tardily filed
under section 501(a) of this title, other than a claim of the kind specified in
paragraph (2)(C) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising
before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent
that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim;
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
petition, on any claim paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection;
and
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
Id Payments to the debtor are last in line in a bankruptcy payout, creating incentive to
avoid a transaction being classified as equity. Id
7 See supra note 2.
8 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d 225.
9 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d 448.
10 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
11 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 457.
Vol. 71:1190
2010] INSIDER LENDING19
factors).' 2 The twenty-plus years of circuit court debt recharacterization
analysis in bankruptcy cases13 have established an inconsistent, ambiguous,
and therefore flawed remedy for parties challenging an insider's claim
against the bankrupt debtor's estate.
Indeed, "[tlhe many different factors employed to determine if courts
should treat an alleged loan as a capital contribution make it difficult for both
lenders and corporate borrowers to predict how the court will view individual
transactions." 14 Insider loans are often made with the "hope of financing a
successfuil rescue attempt"' from bankruptcy.'15 Courts must not inadvertently
prohibit a company's most readily available source of funding by imposing
on insiders an unreasonable fear of loan invalidation because of the existing
capricious doctrine of debt recharacteri zati on.
This Note will argue that, with regard to insider loans, courts must
largely scrap their traditional debt recharacterization analyses. The risk to
business welfare from underinvestment-bankruptcy resulting from
irrationally avoiding positive investments-is greater in this economy than
the risk of overinvestment or financing bad ideas.' 6 However, debt
12 See Bayer Corp. v. Masco Tech., Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics), 269 F.3d 726,
749-50 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comni'r, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th
Cir. 1986)).
13 See My Chi To & Matthew D. Siegel, Debt Recharacterization Looks Back on a
Good Year, 26 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 58 (2007) ("Arguably the first circuit to endorse
debt recharacterization was the Eleventh in [In re N & D Properties]. .. )
14 Jo Ann J. Brighton, Capital Contribution or a Loan? A Practical Guide to
Analyzing Recharacterization Claims (or, When is Equitable Subordination the
Appropriate Analysis?), 21 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 42 (2002).
15 Martin Gelter, The Subordination of Shareholder Loans in Bankruptcy, 26 INT'L
REv. L. & EcoN. 478, 478 (2006).
16 See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-B ankruptcy Investment Incentives,
62 U. Ciii. L. REv. 575, 603 (1995) ("[U]nderinvestment may be relatively intractable.").
Professor Adler seems to favor market efficiency, arguing overinvestment is a substantial
risk and that courts unfortunately "feel they are serving investors when they decline to
void repayments of loans made to 'save' financially distressed firms." Id. at 605 (citing
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 159 (1991)). While I do not disagree with Professor
Adler, I argue the opposite because of unique financial conditions: capital markets are
unwilling to extend project financing, commercial paper availability for ordinary business
operation is locked up, and creditors are irrationally reserved. Therefore, businesses face
extremely heightened risks of failure not due to quality of business plans, consumer
demand, or sound capital structures, but because diminished market confidence has
limited available credit, exacerbating an underinvestment problem. Therefore, companies
need to turn to insiders for financing, and/or loan terms that are necessarily more similar
to equity. Exacerbating the underinvestment problem is that recharacterization, a growing
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recharacterization encourages underinvestment. Recharacterization as it
currently exists is a remedy that unreasonably discourages financial support
of a struggling company's potentially successful business endeavors. 17
Insider lenders simply have no concrete legal basis to know what will
constitute a valid loan that will be respected in bankruptcy.
Traditional debt recharacterization analyses are also flawed because they
attribute determinative significance to often irrelevant and inconclusive
aspects of an insider/company transaction. This Note will assert that the
important inquiry in a debt recharacterization analysis is a close critique of
the individual debtor and the contract entered into with the "lender." Factors
necessary and sufficient to this analysis are: interference with other creditors
and the loan's "visibility" or openness to existing and future creditors;
whether the transaction involves positive or negative covenants; and the
existence and type of a repayment plan accounting for both principal and
interest. These inquiries better characterize the often blurred distinction
between debt and equity transactions and create an element of simplicity
lacking in the debt recharacterization jurisprudence. As a result, insiders
extending funding to troubled companies will have better notice of their risk-
exposure in bankruptcy.
This Note will begin by giving a brief background of debt
recharacterization and showing how it supplements existing bankruptcy
causes of action for creditors and trustees in bankruptcy to avoid claims
judicial response to whether insider loans in bankruptcy will be respected or treated as
equity, is capricious and fails to address current economic realities.
17 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. & Georg Krause-Vilmar, Recharacterization and the
Nonhindrance of Creditors, 7 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 259, 268 (2006). Skeel and
Krause-Vilmar see the issue of insider desire to extend loans to their companies as
instinctual:
A natural inclination of the principal shareholders of a floundering business is to
look in their own pockets (and often the pockets of friends and relatives) for cash to
plug the leaks. They see the problems first, and they may conclude that arranging an
outside loan would be too time-consuming and uncertain. Better that those who
know the business best provide the fuinding themselves.
Id. However, if all shareholder loans were inevitably "good money, badly spent,"
prohibiting such inefficiency would be the proper course of action. Id. at 27 1. Clearly this
is not the case. See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its
Creditors, 90 HA~nv. L. REv. 505, 537-41 (1977). Clark's article, in part, assessed the
propriety of automatic subordination of controlling shareholder claims to the claims of
other creditors. For Clark, an "argument urged against an automatic subordination rule is
that controlling shareholders are frequently. ... the only persons willing to lend to a
small, unkcnown corporation on 'reasonable' terms. It is contended that if the insiders'
creditor claim is not respected in bankruptcy, this source of fuinds may dry up." Id. at 538.
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against the debtor. In Part HlI, this Note will summarize the two recent circuit
court decisions that demonstrate the need for a changed approach to debt
recharacterization. Part IV focuses on four aspects of judicial analysis that
receive the lion's share of attention in recharacterization actions and explains
why they are inapt options when investigating the true status of a transaction
in light of current economic conditions. Finally, Part V sets out new inquiries
that address ambiguities in classification, recognizing existing-although
easing-extenuating economic circumstances surrounding insider financial
transactions. Such inquiries will provide more certainty to recharacterization
analyses, a necessity to encourage support of positive business endeavors.
11. RECHARACTERIZATioN BACKGROUND
This section will begin by briefly discussing the development of debt
recharacterization.18 This section will then note other Bankruptcy Code-
based claim avoidance remedies: equitable subordination, fraudulent
transfers (fraudulent conveyance law), preference law, and non-Code-based
remedies such a's breach of fiduciary duties and piercing the corporate veil.'19
18 Beyond assessing the existence of recharacterization as an additional claimant
remedy in a bankruptcy proceeding, this Note attempts to avoid adding to the sizeable
commentary on the authority of courts to recharacterize debt. For exhaustive explanations
of both sides of the story, see Neil M. Peretz, Recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit:
Has the Supreme Court Finally Derailed the Pacific Express?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
297, 297-98 (2008) (arguing that debt recharacterization is textually based in the
Bankruptcy Code and that state and federal security laws require a proper
characterization of debt and equity, therefore legitimizing the doctrine); see also James
M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State Law, 62 Bus.
LAW. 1257, 1257-78 (2007) (outlining the conflicting lines of cases regarding debt
recharacterization that have developed within the circuits); Kenneth N. Klee & Laine
Mervis, Recharacterization in Bankruptcy, 2005 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CH. 11I Bus.
REORGANIZATioNs 211, 215 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Grupo
Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999), "may lend support
to the minority position that recharacterization is not a legitimate exercise of a
bankruptcy court's general equitable powers under [Section 105(a)]. Recharacterization is
neither authorized by statute nor a traditional equitable power. Just as in Grupo
Mexicano, it may be that to permit bankruptcy courts to recharacterize claims under
Section 105 would be to adopt a rule not of flexibility, but of omnipotence.").
19 The "veil piercing doctrine" is applicable to this discussion in that it allows
creditors to request a court hold certain insiders personally liable for the company's
obligations. See Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 260-61.
19320101
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A. A BriefHistory of Recharacterization
Regardless of a court's ultimate decision about whether it has the
authority to recharacterize debt as equity, courts presented with the issue
routinely begin their analysis by stating that bankruptcy courts are endowed
with general equitable powers 20 and must uphold economic substance2' over
the form or name parties have given a particular transaction. Courts finding
that such authority encompasses changing the label of a transaction to reflect
its true economic substance hold that the Code therefore embraces debt
recharacterization. 22 Most courts have decided that the Supreme Court's
decision in Pepper v. Litton,23 making it incumbent upon bankruptcy courts
to exercise their general equitable power to give effect to the economic
substance of a transaction, affirmed their debt recharacterization power. On
the other hand, some courts believe that general equitable principles are
limited to carrying out the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 24 No
20 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). Section 105(a) authorizes bankruptcy courts to "issue
any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title." Id See Submicron Sys. Corp., 291 B.R. 314, 322 (Bankr. D. Del.
2003) ("Bankruptcy courts have long been recognized as courts of equity."). Similarly.
the United States Supreme Court has stated that a bankruptcy court's equitable powers
ensure that "substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not
prevent substantial justice from being done." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939).
See also Brief of Appellee at 21-22, Dornier Aviation, No. 05-1930 (4th Cir. Nov. 23,
2005) (compiling cases relying on Section 105(a) for power of debt recharacterization).
21 To & Siegel, supra note 13, at 58; see also Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 231 ("If
the court were required to accept the representations of the claimant, as GMBH appears
to argue, then an equity investor could label its contribution a loan and guarantee itself
higher priority-and a larger recovery-should the debtor file for bankruptcy.").
22 The Fourth Circuit in Dornier Aviation, discussed infra, takes this reasoning one
step further by holding that the Code provides express statutory authority to change the
parties' characterization from debt to equity in Section 726(a)'s priority payment scheme.
Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 231-34; see infra note 64 and accompanying text. It is
notable that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dornier Aviation was the first to actually find
such a "clear" statement of the authority to recharacterize debt as equity-thanks to the
Fourth Circuit, the doctrine is no longer floating in equity.
23 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
24 See generally Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ablers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)
("bankruptcy courts must and can only" exercise their powers "within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code"). See also Unsecured Creditors' Corums. of Pac. Express, Inc. v.
Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1986); In re Airadigm. Commc'ns, Inc., 376 B.R. 903, 909-10 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
2007) (holding recharacterization of a claim is never an appropriate exercise of a
Vol. 71:1194
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Code section calls for debt recharacterization. Therefore, the reasoning goes,
debt recharacterization is an improper extension of equitable power.
Nonetheless, recharacterization authority is widely and quickly catching
on-courts often give no basis (other than precedent) for undertaking a
recharacterization analysis.25
Debt recharacterization's circuit court genesis lies in the Eleventh
Circuit.2 6 The court in In re N & D Properties, Inc. stated that only two
instances justifyr deeming a shareholder loan a capital contribution: "where
the trustee proves initial under-capitalization or ... that the loans were made
when no other disinterested lender would have extended credit."27 The court
did not specifically address "debt recharacterization," but it laid the
groundwork for future recharacterization. analysis by stating that courts have
the power to change a loan into a capital contribution for bankcruptcy
purposes.28 A circuit court did not consider debt recharacterization again
until the Sixth Circuit29 adopted an eleven factor balancing test from a prior
Sixth Circuit tax case distinguishing debt from equity.30 However, the
interim period between such circuit decisions (and even prior to In re N & D
Properties, Inc.) was filled with numerous bankruptcy court opinions on
point. Only five bankruptcy courts have actually exercised their stated power
of recharacterization. 31
bankruptcy court's authority because the Code views "claims" broadly, and once that
threshold has been satisfied courts are not to look further into the claim's proper priority).
25 See, e.g., Sender v. Bronze Group, Ltd. (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs.), 380 F.3d
1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (jumping into a comparison of debt recharacterization and
equitable subordination without discussing a Code-based foundation for undertaking the
debt recharacterization analysis).
26 See To & Siegel, supra note 13; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27 79 F.2d at 733.
28 Id.
29 Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 748
(6th Cir. 2001).
30 To & Siegel, supra note 13, at 58. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner originally
applied the eleven factors subsequently adopted for debt recharacterization purposes in
the context of distinguishing debt from equity for tax loss reporting purposes. 800 F.2d
625, 630-32 (6th Cir. 1986).
31 To & Siegel, supra note 13, at 59 n. I (noting four instances of recharacterization:
Diasonics Inc. v. Ingalls, In re Cold Harbor Assocs. L.P., In re Georgetown Bldg. Assocs.
L.P., and In re Atlantic Rancher Inc.). The fifth case is Bunch v. JM Capital Finance,
Ltd. (In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc.), 327 B.R. 389 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005). Furthermore,
"at least two of these cases involved what can fairly be called unusual facts. (In Cold
Harbor, the court made the debt/equity call merely to help determine the number of
claimholders for purposes of deciding whether a single creditor could file an involuntary
2010) 195
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B. Code-Based Claim Avoidance Remedies
At the risk of adopting a too skeptical tone, debt recharacterization is a
way for courts to approach potentially strategic actions by insiders.
Recharacterization largely exists to deal with "shareholder contributions that
are ambiguous in form."32 Such ambiguity stems from the "natural
inclination of the [insiders] of a floundering business [] to look in their own
pockets. .. for cash to plug the leaks."133 Problems arise because the cash
infusions are often described, but not treated, as loans-formal
documentation or interest rate terms are missing, or payments simply are not
made. 34 Such a situation:
makes it look as though the insider is trying to treat the contribution as a
loan if the company performs either very well (and thus can repay it) or
very poorly (winding up in bankruptcy), while treating it as a contribution
to equity while the company's finances remain in a precarious state.35
Recharacterization is a doctrine suited to solve ambiguous loan problems
that may or may not originate from an insider's attempt at strategic behavior
and that are left unaddressed by other Code based remedies.36
First and foremost, judicial agreement on the power to recharacterize
debt as equity notwithstanding, the Code expressly empowers debtors to use
petition under § 303(b), and in Georgetown Building Associates, the cash advances in
question had been treated as capital contributions on the tax returns of the lenders
themselves, and of the debtor, for six consecutive years.)." To & Siegel, supra note 13, at
58.
32 Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 267. Preferred shares issued by the
company to the insider in exchange for funding are representative of the ambiguities
between debt and equity, see infra note 176, but do not apply to problems of ambiguous
loans. See inf/ra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
33 Skeel & Kraus-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 268.
3 4 Id
3 5 Id
36 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of
Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 465, 505-07 ("Courts are well equipped to detect
strategic behavior, and the Bankruptcy Code is replete with provisions that put the court
in this role... . To be sure . .. parties [can] invoke a variety of analogous nonbankruptcy
statutory and common law rules as a means of policing strategic behavior. .. ). As I
discuss in the following paragraphs, nonbankruptcy, common law, and Code "policing"
provisions do not properly address problems posed by ambiguous insider loans, and
therefore debt recharacterization is a necessary gap filler.
196 Vol. 7 1:1
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state law defenses to claims against the estate. 37 The Supreme Court holds
that the determination of property rights in the assets of the bankrupt's estate
is left to state law. 38 Accordingly, bankruptcy law embraces state laws
governing the proper characterization of a claim as either debt or equity. It is
therefore arguable that recharacterization exists as a power under the Code
where state law allows such a remedy. 39
Nearly all recharacterization cases undertake a dual analysis of debt
recharacterization and equitable subordination,40 underscoring similarities
between the two remedies, 41 but noting that they address distinct issues.42
37 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2006) ("[Tjhe trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section
502 .. ")(emphasis added); see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) [hereinafter Travelers] (trustee has available "any
defense available to the debtor under applicable nonbankruptcy law" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
38 Travelers, 549 U.S. at 450-51; see also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56-
58 (1979).
39 See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 18, at 1268-80 (stating that using state
law recharacterization standards leads to supporting capital markets "by restoring
predictability in the enforcement of insider debt," and resolves federal circuit court
conflicts); Peretz, supra note 18, at 298.
40 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) ("[A]fter notice and a hearing, the court may--(1) under
principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part
of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed
interest to all or part of another allowed interest. .. ). The law of equitable
subordination is well-settled-three requirements exist for an equitable subordination
claim: (1) inequitable conduct, (2) resulting in injury or unfair advantage to the claimant,
and (3) equitable subordination would not be inconsistent with the Code. Benjamin v.
Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977) (compiling
equitable subordination cases to establish elements of the remedy); see also In re
Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 1997). Two recent cases have
reaffirmed the need for unsecured creditors to show harm to successfully challenge the
claims of secured creditors under equitable subordination: Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI
Restructuring, Inc.), 532 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2008) and In re Kreisler, 546 F.3d 863,
866 (7th Cir. 2008).
41 See Skeel & Krause-Vilnar, supra note 17, at 266 (noting that the very
codification of equitable subordination "raised questions about bankruptcy courts'
authority to recharacterize debt as equity"). Furthermore, the line between equitable
subordination and recharacterization is certainly blurred. See id at 267 ("[C]ourts' sense
of the propriety of the shareholder's behavior seems to influence their decision whether
to recharacterize."). Shareholder (or, as I use in this Note, "Insider") behavior is the
quintessential inquiry in an equitable subordination analysis. See infra notes 42-45.
2010] 197
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Equitable subordination is applicable when equity concerns call for a
reordering of payment priority-the legitimacy of a creditor is not
questioned, only its acts demand that other creditors take precedence. 43 "In
contrast, the focus of a recharacterization inquiry is whether 'a debt actually
exists"'..; in other words, recharacterization gets at the root of the transaction
and essentially attaches a "proper characterization in the first instance of an
investment."44 This fundamental difference leads courts to address debt
recharacterization before equitable subordination, as doing otherwise would
be equivalent to "taking the cart before the horse."45
The main difference in application between the two remedies is that no
inequitable conduct is necessary to recharacterize a claim as an equity
interest.46 One can imagine a situation where a shareholder finances a
struggling company's acquisition of inventory, taking a security interest in
the obtained items, yet never requiring repayment. Should the company's
hard times not be solved by the infusion, it enters bankruptcy. Suppose a
creditor ends up unhappy with its prospects in bankruptcy, partially due to
the shareholder's "claim." Arguably, the shareholder engaged in a perfectly
reasonable transaction with the company. A creditor's opportunity to
challenge such a situation to improve its own financial return out of the
debtor's estate relies upon a court deeming the shareholder's infusion of
funds to be an equity contribution, thereby eliminating the shareholder's
relative priority. However, challenging the transaction on grounds of
equitable subordination would not be a successful option. Recharacterization
instead looks to the transaction's objective criteria, ignoring form in favor of
true substance, which might in this case result in an equity characterization. 47
Malfeasance is not an issue. Because debt recharacterization is applicable,
4 2 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 454 ("Yet recharacterization and equitable
subordination address distinct concerns."). Recharacterization differs significantly by
looking "through a transaction labeled as a loan (debt) and instead [characterizing] it
based on its economic substance as an equity contribution." Klee & Mervis, supra note
18, at 213.
43 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 454.
44Id
4 51Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls,
121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990)).
46 Bayer, Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726,
748 (6th Cir. 2001).
47 Sender v. Bronze Group, Ltd., (In re Hedged-lnvs.Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1297
(10Oth Cir. 2004).
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inter alia, to transactions devoid of inequitable conduct, it is a distinct
remedy.48
The result of recharacterization also differs from explicit Code-based
remedies, and other options traditionally available for creditors to challenge
the claims of other parties to a debtor's estate. Recharacterization imposes an
absolute subordination of the entirety of a claim; indeed, debt
recharacterization has a "draconian effect..,. on the rights of the lenders
involved."149 Therefore, rather than merely subordinating the claim, a loan
subject to debt recharacterization essentially changes form to an equity
interest and is placed in an entirely different class of rights against the
debtor.50  Therefore, equitable subordination is inapposite to
recharacterization, regarding both judicial inquiry and remedy imposed..
In addition to equitable subordination, fraudulent conveyance law is a
Code-based remedy that allows trustees to avoid debtor transfers or
obligations incurred within two years of filing a bankruptcy petition.5'
4 8 But see infra Part WVA (discussing inconsistent treatment by courts of whether
inequitable conduct is required for debt recharacterization).
49 To & Siegel, supra note 13, at 59.
50 See, e.g., 2E Bankr. Service L. Ed. § 25:357, Interests Not Amenable to Equitable
Subordination ("If a particular advance is a capital contribution rather than a debt, then
there is no need to consider whether claim for that advance should be equitably
subordinated to claims of other creditors.").
51 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006):
The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any'transfer to or for the benefit of an
insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an
employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily-(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after
the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B3)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and (ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation; (11) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an
unreasonably small capital; (111) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured;
or (IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such
obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not
in the ordinary course of business.
State fraudulent conveyance law supplements the Code's fraudulent conveyance
requirements and limitations. See In re Revco D.S.. Inc., 118 B.R. 468, 474 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990); supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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However, fraudulent conveyance law is inapt to a recharacterization analysis
because the challenge in a recharacterization action is against the insider's
contribution, rather than consideration issued in exchange for a debtor's
transfer. The Bankruptcy Code adopted Section 548 to allow a debtor's
creditors to combat either constructive or actual fraud that may result from a
debtor's attempts to transfer assets to the detriment of such existing
creditors. 52
The Code's voidable preference law53 intends to protect creditors by
cancelling a debtor's eve of bankruptcy transfers to creditors that
disproportionately benefit that creditor and defeat the Code's underlying
policy of pooling the debtor's assets for equal distribution according to the
Code's strict priority scheme.54 Therefore, preference law addresses whether
payments actually made to a creditor within a 90-day time period prior to
bankruptcy are to be returned to the debtor's estate. In contrast,
recharacterization pertains to classifyring the priority level of a transaction
between a party and the debtor.
Debtors in bankruptcy, including directors and officers, owe fiduciary
duties to creditors.55 Therefore, the voluminous fiduciary duty case law in the
United States also applies in bankruptcy to protect creditors and others with
claims against, or interests in, the debtor. Furthermore, the veil piercing
doctrine may be used to remedy abuses of the corporate form, such as fraud,
or where adhering to the corporate form would create inequitable results.56
The occurrence of bankruptcy does not prevent courts from stepping in to
prevent or remedy an abuse of the corporate form.57
52 See Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 261. Professor Clark proposed that
fraudulent conveyance law was the stimulus for other creditor protections in the Code
and under nonbankruptcy law that developed to fill the cracks left by "transaction-
specific requirements of fraudulent conveyance law." Id. at 261-62 (citing Clark, supra
note 17. at 509-13).
53 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
54 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977) (two underlying policies of
preference law are discouraging creditors from "racing to the courthouse to dismember
the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy," thereby promoting the debtor's cooperation
with all creditors, and ensuring equality of distribution of the debtor's estate among its
creditors).
55 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comnic'ns Corp., No. 12150,
1991 Y&L277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 199 1).
5 6 See 2 JAmhEs D. Cox & THOMAs LEE HAzEN, Cox AND HAzEN ON CORPORATioNs
§ 7.08 (2d ed. 2003).
57 Id; see also supra notes 35-3 7 & accompanying text.
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111. Two RECENT CASES: DORNIERAA TION AND SUBkMcR oN SYSTEMS
This Part will discuss a 2006 Fourth Circuit case58 and a 2006 Third
Circuit case 59 analyzing recharacterization claims against insider
transactions. The Fourth Circuit in Dornier Aviation became the first circuit
to actually act on its stated power of recharacterization, classifying a parent
airplane manufacturer's (Fairchild) parts transactions with its subsidiary
(DANA) as equity when the subsidiary found itself in bankruptcy. The Third
Circuit in Submicron Systems determined that corporate insider contributions
to the debtor's major lender to ensure continued loan extensions were not
equity transactions, therefore denying the creditor committee's
recharacterization claim. The ultimate inquiries of the two circuits are
inconsistent with each other. The inconsistency exacerbates the notice
problem posed by current debt recharacterization tests.
A. Dornier Aviation
The portion of the Dornier Aviation bankruptcy proceeding relevant to
this Note involves Fairchild's $90 million claim for transactions with DANA
regarding aircraft manufacturing parts, i.e. intercompany trade debt.60 The
issue was whether trade credits extended by the parent, Fairchild (a German
aircraft manufacturer), to the debtor (DANA), were capital contributions
constituting equity. DANA was found to be under-capitalized-its financials
immediately preceding the bankruptcy filing consisted of $50,000 of equity
and nearly $50 million of negative accumulated earnings and profits and
shareholder equity-and as a 100% shareholder of DANA, Fairchild was an
insider of the debtor. 6 '
Fairchild did not require DANA to pay for the parts transactions until
DANA became profitable-Fairchild treated DANA as an investment,
according to the Chief Financial Officer.62 The Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (Committee) sought to have Fairchild's $90 million
claim reduced to reflect the amount owed by DANA as determined by an
58 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d 225.
59 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d 448.
60 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Fairchild Domier GMBH (In re
Dornier Aviation (N. Am.) Inc.), No. 02-82003-SSM, 2005 WL 4781236, at *21 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2005) [hereinafter In re Dornier Aviation].
61 Id at *2.
62 Id at *5. The stated purpose for such treatment was to allow DANA to establish
its business and services. Id.
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independent audit report (about $28 million), and recharacterized as equity.63
The court ultimately held that $84 million of the claim was equity, and $6
million constituted debt. The $84 million portion of Fairchild's claim was
therefore recharacterized.64
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia first stated that
the Committee had not carried its burden of proof under Section 5 1 0(c)(1) to
establish equitable subordination of Fairchild's claim.65 Even though
Fairchild was an insider of DANA, and DANA was under-capitalized at the
time of the transactions, the Committee had not shown unfair conduct
justifying equitable subordination of an otherwise valid claim.66
The court then listed recharacterization tests from the Fifth, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits.67 These tests narrowed down to an inquiry of whether there
was proof of under-capitalization and if the loan was made when no other
disinterested lender would have extended credit. 68 The court ultimately found
the lack of a fixed maturity date and "the hope of payment out of future
profits," to be "exactly what characterizes an equity investor."69 Formal
instruments evidencing the "claim" and accrual of interest on the "loan"
could not save Fairchild from debt recharacterization.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court, finding that
bankruptcy courts must be empowered to resolve characterization disputes to
facilitate the Code's payment hierarchy under Section 726(a).70 The court
63 Brief of Appellee at 46, Domnier Aviation, No. 05-1930 (4th Cir. Nov. 23, 2005).
6Inre Dornier Aviation, 2005 WL 4781236 at *2 1.
65 Id. at * 17.
66 Id.
67 Id. at *18-19.
68 See In re N&D Props., 799 F.2d at 733; Herzog v. Leighton Holdings, Ltd. (In re
Kids Creek Partners, L.P.), 200 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1996).
69 Inre Dornier Aviation, 2005 WL 4781236 at *19.
7 0 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 233 (power of recharacterization "is integral to the
consistent application of the Bankruptcy Code"). Section 105(a) authorizes bankruptcy
courts to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title." 11I U.S.C. § 105(a). Therefore, bankruptcy courts may
recharacterize claims to effectuate Section 726(a), whereby equity holders' recoveries are
subordinated to claims of secured and unsecured creditors. Id. § 726(a):
Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be
distributed-
[first according to section 507, second to allowed unsecured claims, third to tardily
filed unsecured claims, fourth to any allowed claim for fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or
punitive damages to the extent that the claim is not compensation for actual
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looked at multi-factor balancing tests from the Sixth7' and Tenth Circuits
(finiding them substantially similar72) to determine whether the transaction
reflected the characteristics of an arn's length negotiation. In finding the
transactions "on the whole. ... more consistent with a capital contribution,"
the Fourth Circuit in Dornier Aviation affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision that the significant aspects at issue were:
(1) [the parent's] insider status, (2) 'the lack of a fixed maturity date' for the
purported loan, (3) the fact that [the debtor] would not be required to pay
until it became profitable, (4) [the debtor's] 'long history of unprofitability
and the fact that its liabilities after the corporate restructuring far exceeded
its assets,' and (5) [the parent's] assumption of [the debtor's] losses.73
In effect, "the substance of the relationship represented a capital contribution
designed to prop up the struggling subsidiary."174 The bankruptcy court's
explanation of why, on balance, the transactions evidenced equity rather than
debt focused on "the lack of a fixed maturity date," that "payment would be
made only when [the debtor] became profitable," the lack of evidence that
the debtor could obtain third party financing because of a history of
unprofitability and liabilities far exceeding assets.75
In Dornier Aviation, "whether the transaction bears the earmarks of an
arm's-length bargain" is the quintessential starting point for recharacterizing
pecuniary loss, fifth for interest payments on any claim previously allowed by this
section, and]
sixth, to the debtor.
71 The eleven In re Autostyle Plastics factors are:
(1) the names given to the instruments, if any, evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the
presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the
presence or absence of a fixed rate or interest and interest payments; (4) the source
of repayments; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of
interest between the creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the
advances; (8) the corporation's ability to obtain financing from outside lending
institutions; (9) the extent to which the advances were subordinated to the claims of
outside creditors; (10) the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital
assets; and (11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayments.
Bayer, Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 749-50
(6th. Cir. 2001).
72 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234 n.6.
7 31Id. at 234.
7 4 Id at 235.
75 In re Dornier Aviation, 2005 WL 4781236 at * 19.
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a claim as equity.76 The "arm's-length bargain" inquiry boiled down to the
debtor's financial weaknesses, causing the court to deem it an unattractive
borrower. While the court was sure to note that undercapitalization and
insider status of a claimant is insufficient to support recharacterization, 7 7
such factors provided the foundation for upholding the bankruptcy court's
decision recharacterizing Fairchild's claims against the debtor's estate as
equity contributions.
B. Submicron Systems
The Third Circuit's recent decision regarding debt recharacterization
attempted to extract the intent of the parties to a challenged transaction.78 In,
Submicron Systems, the defendant insiders extended loans to protect their
prior investments in the debtor. They argued in part that had funding not
been provided, the debtor would have been liquidated.79 Therefore, self-
interest compelled the extension of funding: "[w~hen a company is in
distress, the only parties motivated to put new money in are those that
already have a financial stake."180 The bankruptcy court accepted this
reasoning and held that it was "beyond dispute in the record that .. , the
intent of the parties was to create debt."18'
Accordingly, the Third Circuit stated that the various tests put forward by
courts in recharacterization cases "devolve to an overarching inquiry: the
7Id;see also In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d at 749-50 (the eleven factors
all indicate whether the transaction "appears to reflect the characteristics of. .. an arm's
length negotiation"); In re Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at 915.
77 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
78 In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 291 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) [hereinafter In re
Submicron Sys.].
79 Id at 324-25.
80 Id at 325.
81 Id In re Submicron Systems used seven factors from a 2000 case in the same
court deciding whether a security was equity or debt by looking to the contract existing
between the corporation and those holding securities. Id at 323 (citing Official Comm. of
the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Blackstone Family Inv. P'ship (In re Color
Tile, Inc.), 2000 WVL 152129 (D. Del. 2000)). The seven factors used were:
(1) the name given to the instrument; (2) the intent of the parties; (3) the presence or
absence of a fixed maturity date; (4) the right to enforce payment of principal and
interest; (5) the presence or absence of voting rights; (6) the status of the
contribution in relation to regular corporate contributors; and (7) certainty of
payment in the event of the corporation's insolvency or liquidation.
Id
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characterization as debt or equity is a court's attempt to discern whether the
parties called an instrument one thing when in fact they intended it as
something else." 82 Such intentions are exposed by inquiring whether the
lending party expected to be repaid regardless of the borrower's fortunes, or
subject to the borrower's fortunes. 83 However, affirming the lower court's
factual findings to refuise the claim for recharacterization, the Third Circuit's
opinion of "ample evidence" to support a debt characterization was rooted in
form: the funding was named "debt," it had a fixed maturity date and called
for fixed interest, and the notes evidencing the debt were recorded as secured
debt.84 Notably, the bankruptcy court's findings that even though the debtor
was severely undercapitalized and insolvent, and that no disinterested third
party lender would have advanced financing to the debtor, were not sufficient
to overcome the indicators of debt previously mentioned.85 It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the Third Circuit's inquiry into "intent" was based
on form.
C. Conclusions on Dornier Aviation and Submicron Systems
Courts considering recharacterization cases use about a dozen different
factors when deciding whether to recharacterize debt as equity. The factors
are intended to uncover the true substance of a claimant's transaction with
the debtor. The two decisions discussed above shed light on the true
substance behind the multi-factor inquiries: party characterization is trumped
by objective inquiries into the quality of the borrower, or the intent of the
parties to the transaction is the decisive consideration.
These inquiries are inconsistent and flawed. Eleven or thirteen factor
tests, with no dispositive factor, are necessarily ambiguous and are too vague
to properly alert current and potential lenders of whether a bankruptcy court
82 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 456 (emphasis added).
83 Id. (the former indicates debt and the latter indicates equity); see also In re St.
Charles Pres. Investors, Ltd., 112 B.R. 469, 474 (D.D.C. 1990) (limited partners treated
as creditors of debtor due to ight to receive interest "regardless of the debtor's earnings
of profits"). The court also noted that the partners' additional right to receive a
percentage of earnings and profits represented an equity interest and not a debt. Id.
84 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 457.
85 In re Submicron Sys., 291 B.R. at 323. The court held that the plaintiff
challenging the transactions at issue as equity "failed to prove that under [the debtor's]
dire circumstances, defendants' transactions were improper or unusual." Id at 325. In so
holding, the court accepted the defendants' expert testimony that existing lenders
extending loans to distressed companies do not apply traditional factors such as
"1capitalization, solvency, collateral, ability to pay cash interest and debt capacity ratios"
as they would when lending to a financially stable company. Id
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will respect the label attached to a particular transaction. The "creditor" in
Dornier Aviation abided by formalities, imposed a commercially reasonable
interest rate, 86 intended to be repaid,87 and had an independent auditor
examine the transactions 88 (concluding that a "debt" did indeed exist).
Nonetheless, Fairchild's insider status, lack of a fixed maturity date, delayed
payments until the debtor became profitable, and the debtor's liabilities
exceeding its assets, established the equity characterization. 89
Where a sizeable number of factors in a non-exclusive and disjunctive
test weigh in favor of both debt and equity, parties can only be left with the
conclusion that courts are acting on what they believe to be the equitable
result. The broad array of factors used in debt recharacterization. balancing
tests inevitably results in judges making subjective decisions.90 Bankruptcy
and circuit courts therefore apply non-uniform standards. Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit's reliance on Fairchild's intent to be repaid out of DANA's
profits is also indicative of courts saying they look to the objective mndicia of
an arm's length negotiation, yet actually recharacterizing debt on the basis of
intent. The distilled inquiries resulting from multi-factor tests applied by the
Fourth and Third Circuits remain inconclusive.
One of the most disconcerting aspects of Dornier Aviation is the fact that
Fairchild acted as a supplier to its debtor, DANA, yet had its legitimate
transactions recharacterized as capital contributions. When Fairchild sold
aircraft to customers, the aircraft were covered by a warranty, and the buyers
had the option to purchase a set of provisional parts.9' DANA issued the
warranties and sold the provisional parts packages. DANA was charged
above cost for the parts packages it purchased from Fairchild.92 Fairchild did
not immediately seek payment for the transactions; instead, Fairchild allowed
DANA opportunity to become profitable before requiring reimbursement. 93
The commercial reasonableness of this interaction is hard to question.
Extensions of credit occur precisely to account for situations where the
debtor is unable to immediately afford the needed items. Also, as respected
8Inre Dornier Aviation, 2005 WL 4781236 at *8.
87 Id at *5.
88Id. at *9-11.
89 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
90 Hilary A. Goehausen, You Said You Were Going to Do What to Myr Loan? The
Inequitable Doctrine of Recharacterization, 4 DEPAuL Bus. & Com. L.J. 117, 128
(2005).
91 In re Dornier Aviation, 2005 WL 4781236 at *4-5.
92 Id. at *4.
93 Id at *4-.
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by the Third Circuit in Submicron Systems, creditors will often seek to
protect their earlier extensions of funds by providing bridge loans to get a
debtor through hard times.94 Circuit courts are rarely, if ever, presented with
pleas for debt recharacterization of outside creditor loans. 95 Therefore, it
seems that the parent/subsidiary relationship in Dornier Aviation was more
important to the court's decision than it let on. Dornier Aviation essentially
encourages creditor committees and trustees in bankruptcy to immediately
challenge any extension of funding by a corporate insider. This is
inconsistent with the Third Circuit's implicit holding in Submicron Systems
that having appropriate loan formalities is the prevailing inquiry in debt
recharacterization. The contradictions between circuits, as well as within an
individual case, make the need for new debt recharacteriazation tests all the
more apparent.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT ANALYSIS
Recharacterization is an important option for challenging insider loans as
equity.96 Insiders, probably more than other parties with an interest in or
claim against the debtor, have an incentive to disguise an equity contribution
as a loan-they protect their sweat equity, prior investment, and business
vision by providing funding to step back from the edge of insolvency, and
gain priority relative to equity holders in bankruptcy if the transaction is
respected as a loan.9 7 Arguably, and understandably, insiders would like to
have their cake and eat it too-maintain the viability of past investments, and
receive the benefits, but not the risks, of equity. However, notwithstanding
94 See also In re Ati. Rancher, Inc., 279 B.R. 411, 411 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
95 See supra note 2.
96 See supra Part 11; see also Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Dequity: The Blurring
of Debt and Equity in Securitized Real Estate Financing, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 233, 251
(2005) ("It is because of its flexibility that recharacterization is a more powerful tool than
equitable subordination."). Professor Poindexter also notes that the "very flexibility [of
recharacterization] ... is a double-edged sword for creditors." Id. at 252.
97' See Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 272 ("To be sure, shareholder
manages... tend to view [the business] through the rosiest of glasses. They also have a
huge human capital investment in the company. The shareholder's decision to make a
loan therefore may be anything by objective."). Furthermore, a shareholder loan may
prevent creditors from taking actions into their own hands and throwing the debtor into
bankruptcy involuntarily. Id. at 270; 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). However, creditors
involuntarily commencing a Chapter 11I or Chapter 7 case against the debtor must show
that the "debtor is generally not paying [its] debts as such debts become due .. "Id.
§ 303(h)(1). The insider's loan very well may enable the company to pay its creditors and
avoid the involuntary case.
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this potential for manipulation, Congress determined more than thirty years
ago when it enacted equitable subordination in the Code that insider loans
were not to be automatically subordinated in bankruptcy. 98 Such a decision is
conclusive of the need to properly critique insider loans.
However, the factors courts use to get at the true substance of a loan
through debt recharacterization can be greatly improved to more accurately
represent the appropriate label of an insider's debt or equity transaction, and
provide notice to potential insider lenders about what will constitute a loan in
a judge's eyes. Regardless of judicial hesitation to actually apply the
doctrine,99 the inconclusive nature of debt recharacterization. analyses and the
substantive inquiries courts undertake work a disservice on the success of
small and medium sized businesses.' 00 Insider transactions supporting an
otherwise healthy company struggling from current general economic
malaise are not encouraged by debt recharacterization's inquiry into
numerous generic objective indicia of debt or equity. As Dornier Aviation
and Submicron Systems represent, even the elaborate arm's length
negotiation test, and the amorphous "intent of the parties to the transaction"
test, are not exclusive. 101
This Note does not intend to criticize courts for inadequate attention to
the dilemma of insider loan characterization. Without fail courts approach the
issue with exhaustive factual analysis. Furthermore, it is clear that
bankruptcy courts are "adept at dealing with classifications of either debt or
equity."102 However, "[w]here it becomes difficult is classify'ing a claim that
has attributes of both debt and equity."' 03 Courts are firmly grounded in
precedent under the wide reaching understanding of stare decisis, which, in
the debt recharacterization analysis, unfortunately results in a misplaced
98 See Report of the Comm. on the Bankr. Laws of the U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
pt. 2, at 115 (1973). Congress codified equitable subordination in 1978 when reforming
the bankruptcy laws. The committee submitting the reforms suggested automatic
subordination of insider claims to the bankrupt's estate. Such provision was not,
however, included in the final legislation. Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 265-
66, 273, 284 (arguing for automatic disallowance of shareholder security interests,
treating the same as unsecured claims because "secured shareholder loans so often and so
thoroughly" hinder creditors).
99 See supra Part 11. notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
100 See Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 270 ("[Rleal world of financially
troubled companies" that "figure in many of the recharacterization cases" consists
particularly of "small- and medium-sized businesses.").
1 01 See supra Part Il.C.
102 Poindexter, supra note 96, at 248.
103 Id
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focus. Bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts alike have largely decided that
the difficult distinction between "blurred" debt and equity in the context of
an insider transaction is to be made primarily on four factors: an insider's
inequitable conduct, whether the debtor was adequately capitalized, the
debtor's creditworthiness, and the insider's decision to secure the loan.'04
Unfortunately, the inquiries are inapt, giving credence to issues out of
precedent rather than commercial reasonableness. Adequate capitalization,
creditworthiness, and presence of security are particularly worrisome factors
given today's tight economic climate.
A. Inequitable Conduct
Courts should summarily dismiss inequitable conduct as a relevant debt
recharacterization inquiry.' 05 While not specifically enumerated in the
multiple factor tests used to make a recharacterization determination, 10 6
courts nevertheless use inequitable conduct as a proxy for recharacterizing
debt as equity.' 07 in other words, inequitable conduct makes it easier for a
104 Brighton, supra note 14, at 42 (factors courts typically consider "fall into three
critical groups: (1) the formality of the alleged loan agreement, (2) the financial situation
of the company when the creditor made the purported loan and (3) the relationship
between the creditor and the debtor").
105 Indeed, some courts and practitioners assert that debt recharacterization does not
require inequitable conduct. In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 748-49; James H.M.
Sprayregen et al., Recharacterization from Debt to Equity:~ Do Bankruptcy Courts Have
the Power?, 19 No. 5 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (2002).
106 See discussion supra note 7 1.
107 See In re Zenith Elec. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 107 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (requiring
inequitable conduct for debt to equity recharacterization); Anderson v. A.F. Walker &
Son, Inc. (In re A. F. Walker & Son, Inc.), 46 B.R. 186, 189-90 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985)
("Courts do continue to talk however in terms of requiring a showing of actual
misconduct on the part of the insider without explaining whether an 'unfair
advantage' .. ,. is or is not equivalent to their concept of the required misconduct."); see
also Robert J. Graves, Loans to "Insiders ": How to Avoid Recharacterization in
Bankruptcy, 3 BANKING L. REV. 18, 22-23 (1990). In recharacterizing a lessor's claim
against the debtor as a capital contribution, the court established a standard regarding
inequitable conduct:
For insider dealings to be characterized and set aside as capital contributions, it must
be established: (1) that the transactions lacked the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain, and (2) that it was for the purpose of engaging in some type of inequitable
conduct that resulted in either injury to arm's length creditors or unfair advantage to
the insider.
Id (citing In re LaBelle Indus., Inc., 44 B.R. 760 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984)); Rego Crescent
Corp. v. Tymnon (In re Rego Crescent Corp.), 23 B.R. 958, 965 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
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court to justify' such a "draconian" 08 action. Inequitable conduct overlaps
application of the doctrine of equitable subordination, causing confusion
between the two similar doctrines. Furthermore, inequitable conduct is
unnecessary for a claim to be recharacterized as equity-recharacterization's
purpose is to accurately reflect the nature of the transaction, a purpose
separate from passing judgment on good or bad faith conduct. Finally, a
party aggrieved by an insider's inequitable conduct may use equitable
subordination to remedy any harm incurred.
To begin, Congress codified equitable subordination in 1978, leaving to
courts development of the principle.'09 Subsequent Supreme Court and
circuit court decisions established inequitable conduct as a necessary element
for equitable subordination of a claim against the debtor's estate. 110 Its
inclusion in a debt recharacterization analysis results in confusion of the two
different remedies.'1
Furthermore, where a statutory remedy already exists, bankruptcy courts
must not use their equitable power to achieve the same result of the pre-
existing and codified remedy through a different method. The Ninth Circuit's
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has outright rejected the viability of the doctrine
of recharacterization for this reason. 112 Pacific Express held that because
recharacterization accomplishes the same result as equitable subordination
through different means, recharacterization contradicts congressional intent
("[Iln many cases where the courts have subordinated debts arising from insider loans
there has been some inequitable conduct.
108 To & Siegel, supra note 13, at 59.
109 H.R. REP. No. 98-882, at 576 (1984) (Conf. Rep.).
110 See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996) (inequitable conduct necessary
for application of equitable subordination); Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of
Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160 F.3d 982, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1998) (equitable
subordination requires that "the claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable
conduct"); see also cases cited supra note 40.
111 See In re 200 Woodbury Realty Trust, 99 B.R. 184, 188 n.4 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1989) (in context of attack against insider's transaction with an undercapitalized debtor,
"it seemed to [the court] that actual misconduct was not a necessary element [to
recharacterization]-although this court may be the only court so noting the distinction")
(emphasis added). To be sure, such confusion has been cleaned up. See In re
Atlanticrancher, 279 B.R. at 433 (compiling cases and noting that "once considered
solely in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable subordination, bankruptcy courts now
consider recharacterization a separate cause of action").
'
12 In re Pac. Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Pac.
Express] (holding that the Code does not provide a basis to recharacterize debt as equity);
accord Pinetree Partners, Ltd. V. OTR (In re Pinetree Partners, Ltd.), 87 B.R. 481, 491
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
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because Congress explicitly provided a remedy to confront -inequitable
conduct in particular."13 Congress's intent by providing for equitable
subordination through Section 51 0(c)( 1), is arguably defeated by making a
judicially crafted addition to the statutory scheme.
Providing challengers of an insider's claim against the debtor a second
remedy with similar burdens to satisfy, 1 14 yet resulting in complete priority
subordination in bankruptcy,"15 accomplishes an undesirable result:
discouraging insider debt-finance assistance to a struggling company by
providing claim challengers a remedy "grab bag" with different severities
and burdens that do not perfectly align."16 Dornier Aviation is illustrative of
this non-alignment.' 17 The Fourth Circuit in Dornier Aviation avoided the
temptation to recharacterize an entire claim as equity, holding that about $6
million (out of an original claim of about $90 million) of the parent
"creditor's" claim would remain characterized as debt. I so doing, the
Fourth Circuit avoided a common concern among recharacterization
opponents-the inequity of converting an entire claim to an equity interest,
113 Pac. Express, 69 B.R. at 115. The Ninth Circuit's opinion stressed the fact that
courts do not have the power to achieve the same result as a codified remedy "under
different standards through the use of the court's equitable powers." Id The Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that the recharacterization of a claim as
an equity interest is never an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court's power because
Section 5 10(c) provides a framework for subordinating claims, and using Section 105(a)
to recharacterize claims to achieve the same result circumvents that framework. In re
Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc., 376 B.R. 903, 913 (W.D. Wis. 2007). Tracking the language
of Section 5 10(c), claims are to be subordinated only to other claims, not "into the lower
tier of interests" -recharacterizing a claim as equity therefore contradicts Congress's
explicit language. Id; accord Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R.
555, 561 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993) ("In providing that claims may be subordinated to claims
and interests to interests, section 510(c) does not authorize recasting of a claim as an
interest.").
114 But cf Poindexter, supra note 96, at 251 ("[T]he stiffer requirements of equitable
subordination need not be met" in a recharacterization case). Professor Poindexter's
recharacterization analysis holds that the inequitable conduct requirement of equitable
subordination, in the form of fraud, illegality, breach of fiduciary duty, and
undercapitalization cases, is not required for debt recharacterization, and judicial
equitable powers to order debt recharacterization reinforces this greater leniency. Id.
115 Sprayregen, supra note 105, at 1 ("[E]quitable subordination results in lower-
priority claim debt, whereas recharacterization converts a creditor's claim to an equity
interest.").
116 Debt recharacterization results in more severe subordination (a change in class
from "claim" to "interest") with a less burdensome showing required for the debt
recharacterization claimant.
117 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
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relegating it entirely to the end of the bankruptcy repayment line. Such
blanket subordination is arguably a more severe form of equitable
subordination," 8 without the attendant proof requirements of unfair or
inequitable conduct." 9
Finally, the inapplicability of equitable or inequitable conduct to
determining either if the objective indicia of the transaction evidence an
arm's length negotiation-as in Dornier Aviation-or whether the intent of
the parties to the transaction was to create a debt-as in Submicron
Systems-should result in this inquiry being trashed. The recharacterization
inquiry takes place before a court will address equitable subordination.'120
"Claims" remain "claims" even when equitably subordinated. However, if a
"4claim"' is recharacterized as "equity," then by definition such an interest is
not a "claim."12' Therefore, the threshold inquiry is determining whether a
transaction represents a "claim." Equitable conduct has no bearing on this
determination.
B. Inadequate (or Under) Capitalization
In determining adequate capitalization' 22, both in the debt
recharacterization context and otherwise, courts look to the debt/equity ratio
of a particular company.' 23 Such courts often look to the adequacy of
capitalization at the time of the challenged transaction. 124 The purpose of
118 To & Siegel call this a "sub rosa attempt at equitable subordination." To &
Siegel, supra note 13, at 58.
119 Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 18, at 1257 ("[A] cause of action in federal
court for debt recharacterization can be easier to prove than an action for equitable
subordination.").
12 0 See supra Part H.B.
121 11 U. S.C. § 10 1(5), (16) (2006).
122 See Ronald R. Sussman & Michael A. Klien, Recharacterization Battles Likely
in Next Round of Bankruptcies, J. CORP. RENEWAL (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.cooley.comi/58842 (follow "VIEW ARTICLE" hyperlink) (arguing that
courts should primarily look to a debtor's adequate capitalization and creditworthiness in
a debt recharacterization analysis to "ease the evidentiary burden on unsecured
creditors").
123 See Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 630 (debt to equity ratio of 300-to-lI at time
of transaction indicative of capital and not loan); Bauer v. Comm'r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1369
(9th Cur. 1984) (debt to equity ratio determined by tax court was 92-to-is indicating
contribution to risk capital, found unsupported by Ninth Circuit, which found a debt to
equity ratio between 2-to- I and 8-to- I).
12 nre Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at 751 (debt recharacterization context); Roth
Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 630 (characterization for tax purposes); Fruehauf Corp. v.
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such an inquiry is to determine the debtor company's ability to repay the
"loan"125-a higher debt/equity ratio being indicative of an equity
transaction due to the higher risk that a business loss would result in non-
payment of the "loan."'126 In debt recharacterization, however, the emphasis
on undercapitalization is unhelpful as "a company's financial condition is not
always a good barometer of whether a loan is justified." 127
If relevant at all, the inquiry is meaningful onfly with respect to loans
extended contemporaneously with initial inadequate capitalization.'12 8
Indeed, a Massachusetts superior court has stated that: "Re-characterization
of debt as equity is intended to protect creditors dealing with a newly formed
business that is grossly undercapitalized at its inception."' 29 Courts need to
be clear, however, that mere initial undercapitalization does not carry-over to
recharacterize loans extended at a time of subsequent capitalization. Post-
inception undercapitalization should not be sufficient to encourage debt
recharacterization.130 Subsequent capitalization fluctuates and where a
Revitz (In re Transystems Inc.), 569 F.2d 1364, 1369-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (funds advanced
by parent to subsidiary prior to bankruptcy challenged as capital contributions); Estate of
Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 408-409 (5th Cir. 1972) (cause of action for tax
refund).
125 Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957).
126 Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1369.
127 Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 278.
128 In re N&D props., Inc., 799 F.2d at 733 (debt recharacterization appropriate only
where trustee proves initial undercapitalization or there is no other disinterested lender
willing to extend credit); see also Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, "Single
Business Enterprise, " "Alter Ego, " and Other Errors: Academics, Economics,
Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back Towards a Unitary "Abuse"
Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 405, 421 n.76 (2006) (noting
that initial undercapitalization is a "classic abuse" of the corporate form).
129 Millikin & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, No. BRCV2002-1364, 2005 WL
1791562, at *13 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 14. 2005). In general. Massachusetts has
established that shareholder loans substantially contemporaneous with gross initial
undercapitalization are factors indicative of an equity interest. See Yankee Microwave,
Inc. v. Petricca Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); see also
Friedman v. Kurker, 438 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Albert Richards Co. v.
Mayfair, Inc., 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934).
130 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has established three factors necessary for an
insider debt to be recharacterized as equity, one of which is that the corporation's capital
is unreasonably small. Gelatt v. DeDakis (In re Mader's Store for Men, Inc.), 254
N.W.2d 171, 185 (Wis. 1977). Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court looks to gross
under-capitalization, among other factors, to determine whether recharacterization is
appropriate. Tanzi v. Fiberglass Swimming Pools, Inc., 414 A.2d 484, 488-91 (R.I. 1980)
(virtually no security for loan by lender in complete control over corporation capitalized
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company has sufficient initial capitalization, debt recharacterization on the
basis of a period of inadequate capitalization risks converting legitimate
loans into capital contributions. 31 Undercapitalization. developing down the
timeline of a company's existence does not carry the same indications of
intent to get the benefits of equity without its consequences.
Courts undertaking a recharacterization analysis have not provided any
indication as to what constitutes an acceptable amount of debt relative to
equity for a loan to be respected in bankruptcy. In a time when typical
debt/equity ratios can be as high as 30-to-i ,132 and traditional outside
financing is hard to come by,'33 insiders seeking to maintain a company's
operations by extending funding have no foundation to determine the legal
protection of their loans in bankruptcy. Indeed, in In re Submicron Systems,
the plaintiff's expert put forth evidence of the debtor having a debt capacity
ratio of 900-to- 1.134 Nonetheless, the court found the intent of the parties was
to create debt, and therefore did not find such a high ratio meaningful.'13 5
It is important that courts get rid of the traditional notion that loans
contemporaneous with subsequent undercapitalization are influential to debt
recharacterization. When existing lenders make "loans to a distressed
company, they are trying to protect their existing loans and traditional factors
that lenders look at ([] capitalization, solvency, collateral, ability to pay cash
with only $3000 and doing over $200,000 in business, resulted in court finding
contributions to "risk capital rather than bona fide loans"). However, neither court drew
any distinction between initial and subsequent undercapitalization.
131 Following the individualized understanding of the adequacy of a particular
company's capitalization, some relevant inquiries may be to look at the cause of the
inadequate capitalization, or whether the inadequacy stems from a higher than normal
debt/equity ratio.
132 See Introduction to Financial Statement Analysis, No. B4-6959, 724 PRAc. L.
INST. 59, 69 (199 1) ("The debt to equity ratio for many banks may be over 30 ... )
133 See Julie Jargon, On the Front Lines of Debt Crisis, Luggage Maker Fights for
Life, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, at AlI ("[Luggage business] applied the modem American
business playbook: Borrow heavily to grow fast. The strategy worked-until the credit
crisis threw out those rules."); Jeffrey McCracken & Vanessa O'Connell, Wave of
Bankruptcy Filings Expected from Retailers in Wake of Holidays, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12,
2009, at B 1 ("Retailers are particularly vulnerable in the current downturn after a decade
of buoyant consumer spending, which encouraged them to overexpand and overborrow.
Now, the banks and private investors who financed the boom are pulling back.").
134 291 B.R. at 324.
13 5 Id at 327.
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interest and debt capacity ratios) do not apply as they would when lending to
a financially healthy company."' 36
Furthermore, inadequate capitalization is a highly factual inquiry "and
may vary substantially with the industry, company, size of the debt,
accounting methods employed and like factors." 137 Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit's Dornier Aviation decision that "the objective indicia of an arm's-
length negotiation" 138 governs the characterization of a transaction as debt or
equity is difficult to square with the subjective standard applicable to
sufficient capitalization. The Third Circuit's Submicron Systems "intent of
the parties"' 39 inquiry is also inconsistent with an inquiry into whether a
debtor was undercapitalized at the time of the transaction-while the "intent
of the parties" is certainly subjective, intention to extend a loan and get
repaid with interest is not antithetical to having an inadequately capitalized
debtor. The subjective nature of a capitalization -inquiry140 is inconsistent
with the prevailing circuit courts' debt recharacterization tests.
Courts considering whether recharacterization is appropriate in a certain
instance must take notice that "[u]ndercapitalization is not insolvency."114'
Without this understanding debt recharacterization will work to penalize
insiders for extending loans to viable, although struggling, companies.
C. Creditworthiness (Ability to Obtain Financing from Independent
Sources)
The currently stalled lending environment makes a debtor's
creditworthiness a particularly unreliable factor in a debt recharacterization
analysis.' 42 The most striking drawback of creditworthiness as an indicator
116 Id. at 325 (citing Braas Sys., Inc. v. WMVR Partners (In re Octagon Roofing), 157
B.R. 857 (N.D. 11l. 1993)).
137 Brighton, supra note 14, at 43.
138 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234.
139 Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 457.
140 See United States. v. Colo. Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Colo. 1995).
14 Baldi v. Samuel Son & Co., 548 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2008) (fraudulent
conveyance action where trustee did not establish debtor's insolvency and holding that
undercapitalization is not interchangeable with insolvency).
142 See, e.g., Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 278 ("Creditworthiness .. . is
flawed. ... since it may be difficult to determine whether an outside creditor would make
a loan ..... )
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for debt recharacterization is that capital markets are in dire straits,
undermining the creditworthiness of most potential debtors.'143
The concept of insolvency arises in the creditworthiness inquiry, in
addition to capitalization sufficiency inquiries. The Bankruptcy Code
adopted a broad understanding of insolvency-it defines insolvency under a
"balance sheet test."144 Such a definition seems to be in accord with
traditional views that "[a] company is typically deemed 'insolvent' when its
debts exceed the fair value of its assets." 145 As a company's flirtation with
insolvency waxes and wanes, so too does that company's
creditworthiness.'14 6 Therefore, a vicious cycle is obvious: high debt levels
among businesses draw them closer to insolvency, resulting in lower credit
143 See Kelly Spores, Predictions for Entrepreneurship in 2009, WALL ST. J., Dec.
30, 2008, http://blogs.wsj .com/independentstreet/2008/12/30/predictions-for-
entrepreneurship-in-2009:
Access to credit may ease for the most creditworthy entrepreneurs, but it will still be
very difficult for many. Venture-capital and angel investors are expected to tighten
further, and banks will continue to be leery about whom they lend to. Friends and
family, whose retirement accounts and home values have tanked, aren't likely to
come to the rescue.
See also Covel, supra note 3, at AlI ("Even healthy companies are being choked by the
lack of credit lines and bank loans."). But see HSBC Establishes a Fund to Aid Smaller
Businesses: New Global Program Allocates $5 Billion to Ease Credit Crisis, REUTERS
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBlI 228682988960861 83.html.
14 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2006) ("The term 'insolvent' means . .. financial
condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than such entity's property, at
a fair valuation. . . ."). The "balance sheet test"' is distinguishable from the "equity test,"
which is the ability to pay debts as they come due. See Robert J. Steam, Jr., Proving
Solvency: Defending Preference and Fraudulent Transfer Litigation, 62 Bus. LAW. 359,
360-61 (2007). Regardless of the two previously mentioned tests for insolvency, proving
the same is not a simple matter. Issues such as choosing to establish valuation as a going
concemn or as a liquidating entity are important and will produce different results. See id.
at 367-73. Furthermore, the date of valuation, and establishing values of liabilities, are
critical issues for a solvency determination. Id. at 373-78, 381-84.
14 John E. Moose & Patrick M. Jones, Is It Debt, or Is It Equity? How the
Classiication of Hybrid Securities Can Turn a Good Company Bad, 26 Am. BANKR.
INST. L.J. 32, 32 (2007).
146 Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors'
Fiduciary Duties, A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 1, 39 n. Ill1
(2007) (article discussing fiduciary duties near the point of insolvency). Certainly, myriad
other factors contribute to creditworthiness, such as ability to repay debts as they come
due and outside credit ratings by firms such as Standard & Poor's. See Lee B. Shepard,
Note, Beyond Moody: A Re-Examination of Unreasonably Small Capital, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 891, 916-17 (2006).
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ratings and therefore less ability to obtain financing (at affordable rates)' 47
for potentially successful projects or necessary business expenses that would
ultimately reduce debt levels (i.e. amassing inventory in peak sales seasons to
meet demand). Such a seemingly unavoidable cycle results in an inability to
obtain outside financing, which, unfortunately, according to courts in the
debt recharacterization context, "is strong evidence that advances were
capital contributions rather than loans."'148
Furthermore, it is an unlikely assumption that any rational insider would
invest equity in an uncreditworthy, or questionably solvent, company. Such
an investment would be practically worthless.' 49 Therefore, a more rational
assumption is that insolvency is "evidence supporting an investor's assertion
that it was legitimately concerned about repayment of its advance," therefore
intending the advance to be treated as debt.' 50 However, as discussed, courts
addressing debt recharacterization use insolvency and (as I lump the two
together) creditworthiness to indicate a "lender's" attempt to nominally
advance debt, while intending an equity contribution.'15'
Finally, the very existence of debtor in possession financing (DIP
financing), highlights the inappropriateness of creditworthiness to a debt
recharacterization analysis.' 52 DIP financing is attributed primacy in
14 See Marc I. Steinberg, Examining the Pipeline: A Contemporary Assessment of
Private Investments in Public Equity ("PIPES"), I11 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMIP. L. 1, 20
(2008) ("[L]enders frequently will require the subject company to agree to onerous
financial and operational covenants-concessions with respect to which the company
may be unwilling or simply unable to adhere."); The Credit Crisis: Financial Engine
Failure, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 9, 2008, at 79 (stating that a Federal Reserve survey of bank
lending showed that "a good number of bank had imposed stricter lending standards and
higher rates on loans ..... )
148 Brighton, supra note 14, at 43 (citing In re Autoslyle Plastics, 269 F.3d 726).
149 Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 18, at 1265-66.
10I.at 1266.
15 Id
152 The severity of the credit freeze is exemplified by the tightening of the DIP
market. See Jeffrey McCracken & Paul Glader, Tronox Nears Chapter 11, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 12, 2009, at Cl ("The company has been on the market for [DIP financing] for
several months. Since the summer, such lending has largely dried up as part of an overall
credit crunch."); Jeffrey McCracken & Paul Glader, 'DIP' Loans are Scarce,
Complicating Bankruptcies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008, at Cl ("CCredit has gotten so tight
in recent weeks that companies contemplating a bankruptcy filing can't find the cash
needed to get through the process."). But see Matthias Rieker, Citi 's Loan to
LyondeilBasell Shows Banks 'Interest in DIPs, Dow JONEs NEWSWIRES, Jan. 9, 2009.
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bankruptcy payouts.' 53 DIP financing exists at a time when a company is
technically not creditworthy, i.e. it is under the protection of bankruptcy
laws. Therefore, it is inconsistent to use creditworthiness to subordinate an
insider's loan through recharacterization, while giving near-absolute. priority
to loans issued by an outsider as DIP financing while the debtor is by
definition uncreditworthy.
Continued use of weak creditworthiness as a proxy for debt
recharacterization could have the effect of preventing insiders from "ever
loaning money to a company experiencing distress." 154 The commonality of
high debt levels within American businesses, and the credit crunch's effect of
companies looking inward for debt-funding, makes creditworthiness a very
imperfect measure for whether a purported debt transaction is "really" equity.
D. Presence of Security
The existence of security behind a transaction is favored by the courts as
highly indicative of a loan.' 55 Through observing loan formalities, such as
granting security for advances, "lenders can point to [this] hallmark[] of an
arm's-length transaction in response to a challenge to their liens from
unsecured creditors."' 56 This is problematic for at least three reasons: (1) the
effect of encouraging insider security interests potentially to the detriment of
15 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (2006) ("If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of
the debtor ... the trustee may obtain unsecured credit and incur unsecured debt in the
ordinary course of business allowable under section 503(b)(1). ... as an administrative
expense."). Section 507(a) attributes secondary priority (behind domestic support
obligations, which are typically inapplicable to businesses) to "administrative expenses
allowed under section 503(b) .... ". Id. § 507(a)(2). Upon distribution of property of the
estate, Section 726 requires "payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order
specified in, section 507" before all other claims. Id. § 726(a)(1).
15 Brighton, supra note 14, at 43
15 See Submicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 457 (affirming the district court's decision not
to recharacterize the claims as equity, the court found significant that notes were recorded
as secured debt on both SEC filings and UCC financing statements); In re Autostyle
Plastics, 269 F.3d 726, 750 ("The absence of a security for an advance is a strong
indication that the advances were capital contributions rather than loans.") (citing Roth
Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1986)); In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353
B.R. at 839 (fact that loans were secured interests aided decision not to recharacterize).
But see In re Airadigm Commc'ns, 376 B.R. at 909-10. In re Airadigm Communications
dealt with a non-insider situation where loans could only be repaid by surrendering
collateral. Id According to the court, this indicated a debt. Id. However, the court found
significant that the lender was not a shareholder of the debtor, indicating that if the lender
was an insider the court would have been more skeptical of the transaction. Id,
156 Sussman & Klein, supra note 122, at 2.
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other creditors; (2) the fact that often unencumbered assets to back an
insider's loan are nonexistent; and (3) the inconsistent level of importance
attributed to security..
On a practical level, using security as an indicator of a true debt
transaction may encourage insiders to act to the detriment of other creditors.
Indeed, "with shareholder loans, a context where the risk of undermining
creditor recoveries is both systematic and high, the moral assumption that
secured loans will have the effect of hindering creditors is fully
warranted." 57 The presence of security may also encourage waste158 by
protecting an extension of funds to a failing company, resulting in
"4overinvestment" (investment in a company that realistically should fail).' 59
On pure market efficiency grounds, such equity masquerading as debt for
bankruptcy protection purposes should be discouraged. Courts, however
inadvertently, facilitate and encourage these practices by giving "debt"
protection in bankruptcy if there is collateral backing the transaction. 16 0
Regardless of the practical implications, the absence of security backing
an insider's transaction falls short of being an accurate indication of equity.
First, often a company on the brink of insolvency and approaching
bankruptcy has all its assets encumbered and therefore may be unable to
obtain outside financing without entering into difficult to procure
157 Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 276.
158 See Gelter, supra note 15, at 483 (secured debt "in some situations allows
efficient projects to go forward that otherwise would not receive finance, but also enables
transfers of value from original unsecured creditors to a coalition of shareholders and
new, secured creditors.").
15 See supra notes 16-17; see also Adler, supra note 16, at 603 ("[Allthough
unexpected changes in the economy and failed gambles by good firms are possible, such
events may be less likely than the traditional reason for business insolvency, a bad idea
poorly executed."). Security is problematic because "collateral sometimes leads to
overinvestment, but it can be used to solve an underinvestinent or debt overhang
dilemma." Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 272. Overinvestment is equated
with "unwarranted continuation." Id at 279. Skeel and Krause-Vilmar argue that "eve-of-
insolvency" secured loans nearly always lead to overinvestinent and should therefore be
absolutely discouraged. Id at 274.
160 Adler, supra note 16, at 605 ("Unfortunately, courts tend not to understand the
nature of overinvestment and tend to feel they are serving investors when they decline to
void repayments of loans made to 'save' financially distressed firms."). However, as
discussed in Part II, supra, the Bankruptcy Code provides numerous remedies beyond
debt recharacterization for such creditor hindering conduct.
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subordination agreements or accepting overly onerous terms. 161 The insider
therefore becomes an important source of funds. However, security may be
unavailable for the insider's loan. As potentially unwilling to infuse cash that
courts will deem equity, the insider may decide against what she would
otherwise intend to be a loan.' 62 Therefore, requiring security to establish a
loan works to discourage such funding, regardless of any under-or-
overinvestment analysis.
Finally, courts inconsistently assert the importance of security to support
a debt characterization. In In re Transystems, Inc., a parent made advances to
its subsidiary, evidenced by a demand note and secured by substantially all
the assets of the debtor subsidiary.' 63 The Fifth Circuit nonetheless affirmed
the bankruptcy court, finding the transactions at issue to be capital
contributions and not loans. 164 The facts supporting this finding were that no
demand was made on the note (ironic, due to the nature of demand notes),
the debtor was not creditworthy, the parent deemed its subsidiary in need of
capital to achieve its potential, and the parent's increased managerial role.' 65
In contrast, in In re Submicron Systems Corp., the court concluded that at the
time of the extension of funding, the debtor was insolvent,
and there was no collateral available to actually secure the 1999 fuandings.
Defendants were well aware of this fact. However, it is also evident that the
parties intended the 1999 fundings to be secured debt and that defendants
were protecting their past investments (secured debt) by the additional
loans. Under these circumstances, the court declines to recharacterize the
1999 fundings as unsecured debt. 16 6
Therefore, it is clear that, at least in the Third Circuit, security is relatively
unimportant when compared with intent. Submicron Systems is a more recent
case than In re Transystems, Inc., and Submicron Systems presents one of the
prevailing tests for debt recharacterization-intent of the parties.
Nevertheless, security is attributed varying levels of importance, even
considering similar surrounding factual circumstances. Such inconsistency
161 The current hesitation among lending institutions to extend loans is an analogous
situation whereby companies have a difficult time obtaining any type of loan, much less
one with favorable terms.
162 Presumably, this would meet the Third Circuit's test as described in Submicron
Systems Corp., 432 F.3d at 457-58.
163 569 F.2d at 1365.
164Id. at 1369.
165 Id at 1369-70.
16 nre Submicron Sys. Corp., 291 B.R. at 327 (emphasis added).
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contributes to the general lack of notice to insiders regarding whether and
when their transactions will be respected in bankruptcy.
E. A Final Word on Current Inquiries
The very nature of insider lending is arguably either less sophisticated or
less likely to rely on formalities than traditionally obtained loans from banks
or other outside lenders. The effects of the credit crisis-such as tightened
lending standards and decreased consumer demand-mixed with
traditionally high debt levels held by United States businesses, indicate a
current and future increase in insider lending. Courts should therefore change
what they require to satisfy classification as an insider loan in bankruptcy.
The above analysis of the major factors used by courts to make a
decision in favor of or against debt recharacterization in a given bankruptcy
situation shows that the inquiries need to be changed. The combination of
using inappropriate factors, and applying the same inconsistently, results in
difficulties for insiders "to predict ... the outcome of debt recharacterization
cases..... 1 6 7 This difficulty in turn discourages extensions of funding by
those most likely to understand a company's prospects for success, and most
interested in seeing the realization of that potential. Coupled with the lack of
readily available business loans from independent institutions, courts using a
combination of the wrong factors as dispositive of equity contributions will
cause more harm in the coming years as business bankruptcies and debt
recharacterization claims rise in number.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR NEW INQUIRIES
Companies unable to find sufficient operating capital often turn to their
insiders and shareholders for additional liquidity.'168 "With the credit crunch
drying up the capital markets over the past year, the next wave of major
bankruptcies will present issues regarding the validity of such"
transactions. 169 The increasing necessity of insider lending will result in
more situations where insiders have a greater perception of the "true" risk
presented by a loan to a corporation on given terms ... than outsiders
recognize, and ... are unable to articulate and convey ... [this] superior
judgment to the prospective outside lenders at a reasonable cost."1170
167 Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 18, at 1264.
168 Sussman & Klein, supra note 122, at 1.
170 Clark, supra note 17, at 539.
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The uncertainty of recharacterization has potentially chilling effects on
business. Businesses and their counsel have a hard time predicting a court's
likely position on insider transactions. Increased judicial protection will
create "incentive for the investor to contribute the funds to the company in an
effort to return to profitability."'17 1 This is also consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code's intent to treat the class of creditors broadly by including
within the definition of "claim" all "legal obligations of the debtor, no matter
how remote or contingent."'172 For judicial treatment of insider lending cases
to be consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and avoid hindering business
profitability in an anomalous financial climate, courts must change the
current prevailing debt recharacterization tests as exemplified by Dornier
Aviation and Submicron Systems, and look to different factors as proper
indications of the often gray area between debt and equity.
The current tests look to common objective indicia of debt to determine
whether a particular transaction is a debt, evidenced by an eleven factor list
where no single factor controls the outcome. 17 3 Rather than fitting particular
facts of a particular case with multi-factor tests, courts force multi-factor
tests to fit particular facts. A new debt recharacterization inquiry would
justifiably focus on the insider transaction's interference with other creditors
(partially represented by whether the loan is "visible" or open to existing and
fuiture creditors), whether the transaction involves positive or negative
covenants, and the existence and type of a repayment plan accounting for
both principal and interest.
A. Creditor Interference and Visibility of the Transaction
Courts addressing the issue need to distinguish between insider loans that
benefit the company without impairing creditor recovery, and those loans
that do have potential to unfairly degrade the value of creditor recoveries. 174
171 Jonathan A. Carson, Pre-Petition Capital Contributions: The Road to Equitable
Treatment in Bankruptcy, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 403, 435. Indeed, "[tihe
Bankruptcy Code already encourages post-petition investing through [Section] 507 by
allowing post-petition investments priority as administrative expense claims; however, no
such incentive exists in the pre-petition stage." Id (citing 11I U.S.C. § 507); see also
supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
172 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 22 (1978).
173 See supra Part 111.
174 Lynn LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 311, 327-28 (explaining that owners of
small businesses often hang on to their distressed businesses beyond the point of
economic viability, causing creditors to recover less than had the debtor business filed in
bankruptcy earlier).
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Insider loans can negatively impact creditor recovery by either postponing
inevitable bankruptcy and associated payments, or encumbering company
assets or other things of value. 175 Nonetheless, optimism about business
recovery in United States corporate law generally encourages shareholder
loans. However, this must be tempered by any harm unnecessarily posed to
creditors. In the context of creditor recovery in bankruptcy, insider gambling,
or "overinvestment," activity is a particularly acute problem.
Forcing insider loans to be open and visible to other parties with
potential claims against the debtor helps to solve the risks posed by insiders
extending funds. Requiring visibility allows creditors to approach the debtor
and alter the terms of their debt covenants should a creditor feel adversely
affected by the insider transaction. 176 This puts risk assessment in the hands
of parties with an interest in the debtor, rather than with courts which may
not be particularly suited to undertake an exhaustive analysis of risks posed
by an insider's "loan." To be sure, existing state law remedies and
Bankruptcy Code causes of action help creditors avoid losing portions of
their entitlements that may result from improper insider dealings. However,
requiring insider loans to be open to the world to receive debt treatment not
only remedies the problem of distinguishing debt from equity but also helps
to resolve the problem of interference with existing creditors.
Requiring notice is likely an inexpensive (partial) resolution to any risks
posed to creditors by interested insiders extending "loans" to their companies
in a time of distress. Admittedly, notice through visibility has little bearing
on the practical differences between debt and equity, and whether a particular
transaction creates debt or equity. However, using notice begins to solve the
problem of fairness posed by drawing lines in the sand between transactions
carrying indications of both debt and equity.' 77 It also follows in line with
175 Such a dilemma is noted by Skeel and Krause-Vilmar as the "ill founded loan
problem." Skeel & Krause-Vilmar, supra note 17, at 27 1; see also Gelter, supra note 15,
at 478.
176 It should be noted that, due to the Automatic Stay of Section 362(a), once in
bankruptcy, covenants in a company's pre-petition debt no longer apply. I11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(3), (6) (2006); George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REv. 901, 912 (1993) ("The initiation of bankruptcy
proceedings automatically stays creditor enforcement rights and thereby removes the
principal governance lever of the debtholders. As a consequence, restrictive covenants in
the firm's prepetition debt cease to have any effect on the decisions of the firm.").
17 Moose & Jones, supra note 145, at 69-70:
From a litigation standpoint, representatives of a debtor's bankruptcy estate should
determine whether hybrid securities are likely to be characterized as debt or
equity .. .. The process that courts may employ to determine whether to treat hybrid
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Congress's decision to bring under the umbrella of "claim" nearly all legal
interests in the debtor. 178
B. What Type of Rights Does the Transaction Establish?
The contractual nature of debt requires an individualized inquiry into a
claimant's particular transaction with the debtor. 179 This, in part, requires a
risk analysis:
The essential difference between a stockholder and a creditor is that the
stockholder's intention is to embark upon the corporate adventure, taking
the risks of loss attendant upon it,*so that he may enjoy the chances of
profit. The creditor, on the other hand, does not intend to take such risks so
far as they may be avoided, but merely to lend his capital to others who do
intend to take them. 180
Therefore, the level and style of control obtained through the
transaction-which impacts the party's leverage over the debtor-is an
important inquiry in a debt recharacterization analysis. 18 '
The predominance of debt recharacterization. claims against insider
transactions necessitates judicial consideration of insider control over the
debtor.' 82 However, the proper inquiry is to look at what is granted by the
securities as debt or equity is not well settled and should evolve as the issue
becomes increasingly common in bankruptcy-related litigation.
178 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
179 Interview with Paul Rose, Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law,
in Columbus, Ohio (Feb. 15, 2009). In comparison with debt, equity is more statutorily
protected: i.e. existence of statutory duty requirements, director and officer duty of
loyalty concerns, and both federal and state securities laws. Id; see also Poindexter,
supra note 96, at 252 ("The rigidity (or, conversely, fluidity) of obligations and rights
between the investor and the firm will inform the differentiation between equity and
debt.").
180 United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943)
(emphasis omitted).
181 Triantis, supra note 172, at 9 10 (discussing agency problems existing between a
company, its shareholders, and debt holders, with respect to incurring risk and making
investment decisions).
182 Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 561 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1993); see also Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 229-30. It is hard to question the
commercial reasonableness of the parent's inventory transactions with its debtor in
Dornier Aviation. Couple this with the fact that circuit courts are rarely, if ever, presented
with pleas for debt recharacterization of outside creditor loans, and it seems that the
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contract controlling the tran 'saction. If the openness requirement 83 is
followed, an agreement outlining rights will likely exist, regardless of the
size and sophistication of the parties to the transaction. Furthermore, insiders,
by default, have significant control over the debtor company. Therefore,
criticizing the rights granted with respect to the challenged transaction
properly assesses the debt or equity qualities associated with such
transaction.
C. Existence of a Repayment Plan
A traditional characteristic of a debt obligation is the presence of a fixed
maturity date and payment schedule, and presence of a fixed interest rate and
interest payments. 184 The fixed nature of these requirements is questionable
as an indication of debt. Indeed, "there is no compelling reason to treat a
fixed maturity date as a sine qua non of debt. Lack of a fixed maturity date is
not a sine qua non of equity."1185 Instead, the mere existence of a repayment
plan, subject to compromise based on traditional contract principles, is a
requirement that encourages lending in all types of economic environments,
and allows a debtor company to focus on its business and profitability.'186
Furthermore, the requirement of a repayment plan, without necessarily
requiring a fixed payment schedule, imposes a level of flexibility that
supports the widespread understanding that "recharacterization should not be
used to discourage good-faith loans."' 87
However, the flexibility imposed by this suggestion is not absolute. Two
commonly accepted principles impose limits. First, debt is often represented
parent/subsidiary relationship in Dornier Aviation was more important to the court's
decision than it let on.
183 See supra Part V.A.
184 See Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 233, 233-34 (listing the eleven In reAutostyle
Plastics, Inc. factors that "speak to whether the transaction 'appears to reflect the
characteristics of... an arm's length negotiation."').
185 David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial
Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499, 508 (1994).
186 Debt financing itself is intended to provide the issuer flexibility. Cox & HAZEN,
supra note 56, at § 18.01 ("Debt financing. ... provides more flexibility because there
generally is no need for prior shareholder approval."). Debt financing, however, is
different from a loan extended with either security or a contractual agreement issued as
consideration. Both situations create "debt." though, so I lump them together.
187 Dornier Aviation, 453 F.M. at 234.
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by payments that do not fluctuate according to the company's profitability,188
and, absent state statutory law, does not include voting rights.' 89 Profitability
might not, on the face of the agreement, affect required payments, yet the
contractual nature of debt may create leniency. One's status as an insider
should not affect mutual contract alteration. Second, a near universal quality
of equity is that the holder's return is inextricably linked to the issuer's
profitability.'190 Therefore, a strong inquiry for distinguishing debt and equity
is merely looking to the type of payment made to the debt or equity holder.
D. A Simple Combination Applicable to Both Simple and Complicated
Transactions
An analysis of whether the transaction at issue interferes with existing
creditors and is visible to parties interested in the debtor's financial situation,
the types of rights created by agreement, and the payments received by the
"lender," has the virtues of simplicity, notice, and accuracy. Such virtues are
missing from the current debt recharacterization analysis. The complicated,
non-determinative, sometimes objective, and sometimes intent-based
inquiries create confusion. Inconsistency within courts applying the current
test from Roth Steel Tube Co. 191 adds to the complication.'19 2 The last thing a
18 8 See generally David P. Hariton, Equity Derivatives, Inbound Capital and
Outbound Withholding Tax, 60 TAx LAw. 313 (2007). But see Cox & HAZEN, supra note
56, at § 18.02 (long-term corporate debt instruments have "led to the view of bondholders
as 'joint heirs in the corporate fortunes-participants in the success or failure who have
been given preferential rights in the common hazard"' (quoting ARTHuR S. DEWING, THE
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORA-nONs 236 (5th ed. 1953))).
189 COX & HAZEN, supra note 56, at § 18.03 ("Conditional voting rights make bonds
look more like shares of stock, and it is questionable whether in the absence of a statute
such protections can be put into the indenture agreement. .. )
190 Hariton, supra note 188, at 348; Cox & HAZEN, supra note 56, at § 13.01 ("A
share of stock is primarily a profit-sharing contract, a unit of interest in the corporation
based on a contribution to the corporate capital."). Among shareholder rights is the "right
to participate ratably in dividend distributions when declared by the management." Id.
191 Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986).
192 There is also an inconsistency between debt recharacterization test factors and
legitimate outside bankruptcy creditor/debtor efforts to mutually benefit the parties to a
loan. The very idea of debt workouts-essentially negotiations between the creditor and
debtor where payment schedules and other terms are often altered-is such an example,
indicating that many of the commonly used criteria distinguishing debt and equity need to
be changed. A debtor is often quite important to a creditor supplier and therefore the
supplier's best interests will include the debtor's survival. Such creditors may choose to
alter repayment terms to assist the debtor through its rough fiancial condition. Workouts
essentially provide the debtor with more favorable terms than would otherwise exist,
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struggling business and its potential benefactor need is to worry about
whether a court will respect the funding as a loan, and treat it pari passu with
other debt holders should the unfortunate occur. Certainly, the great benefit
of corporate law is the breadth of corporate finance options that exist.193 Its
great headache is the myriad ways courts attempt to deal with financial
ingenuity. The above three proposed factors are an attempt to reduce this
headache in forthcoming debt recharacterization claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lender confidence and ability to issue credit has slowed significantly.
Debt is, and will remain, an integral component of successful business
practices, so the inability to borrow funds will negatively impact business
operations. Where independent, outside funds are largely unavailable, to
remain viable businesses will likely turn to alternative sources of funding-
capital calls, extending repayment terms on existing lines of credit, and
increasingly turning to investors, directors and officers, or other insiders. The
likelihood that the issue of debt recharacterization will come before
numerous bankruptcy courts in the coming years brings the need to
accurately characterize claims against a bankrupt debtor, while taking into
consideration legitimate changes in lending practices. United States courts
need to be sensitive to protecting both creditors and successful rescue
attempts brought on by an uncontrollable and novel credit situation. 19 4
therefore calling into question the importance of the fixed payment and maturity date
requirements, and adequacy of capitalization requirement. See In re Autostyle Plastics,
Inc., 269 F.3d at 750.
193 Preferred shares are illustrative of this benefit. Preferred shares pervade all types
of business structures, and are especially common in the venture capital world. See
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World:
An Emiprical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. EcoN. STUD. 281, 284 tbl.l1
(2003). Preferred shares are notable in the debt recharacterization context because they
blur the line between debt and equity. See Hariton, supra note 185, at 348 ("Preferred
stock ... is a fixed income instrument just like debt, except that investors lack creditor's
rights with the equity holders in the event of the issuer's bankruptcy. Investors in
preferred stock generally do not vote or otherwise control the affairs of the issuer."); see
also Cox & HAZEN4, supra note 56, at § 18.07.
194 See Gelter, supra note 15, at 482 ("Policymaker. .. are facing a tradeoff
between creditor protection and the desirability of potentially successful rescue attempts
in firms on a trajectory towards insolvency.").
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Insiders are parties "most likely to have motivation to salvage a
floundering company." 95 Courts routinely hold the concern of establishing
disincentives to support a troubled company to be an important consideration
when deciding debt recharacterization claims. However, inconsistent and
ambiguous treatment of debt recharacterization discourages "owners and
insiders of struggling [firms from undertaking legitimate] efforts to keep a
flagging business afloat."'96 Changing debt recharacterization will encourage
insider lending in a time of economic instability that negatively impacts
businesses, whether successful or close to bankcruptcy. Extreme market
conditions should not be decisive of successful businesses being subjected to
the risk of bankruptcy, and those on the edge being pressured into
bankruptcy. If courts allow it, insider lending can provide a significant partial
remedy.
195 In re Submicron Sys., 291 B.R. at 325 (quoting In re Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R.
852, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).
196 Sender v. Bronze Group, Ltd. (In re Hedged-lnvs. Assocs.), 380 F.3d 1292,
1298, n.1I (10Oth Cir. 2004)
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